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AL VIS IN WONDERLAND-ASSUMPTION OF
RISK NO LONGER A COMPLETE BAR IN
STRICT LIABILITY ACTIONS?
The Honorable Myron T. Gomberg*
We therefore hold that in cases involving negligence the common law doc-
trine of contributory negligence is no longer the law in the State of Illinois,
and in those instances where applicable it is replaced by the doctrine of
comparative negligence.I
This judicial adoption of pure comparative negligence in Alvis v. Ribar
heralded a monumental change in the course of Illinois tort law.2 By holding
that comparative negligence will be employed "where applicable," the Il-
linois Supreme Court invited further inquiry into the doctrine's parameters.
* Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. J.D., DePaul University College of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Patricia A. Wrona, a third-year law student
at DePaul University College of Law, in the preparation of this article.
1. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 25, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896-97 (1981); see also infra notes
92-99 and accompanying text.
As this article goes to press, the Illinois Supreme Court has rendered its decision in Coney
v. J.L.G. Indus., No. 56306 (II. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983). See infra note 8. In an opinion
written by Justice Moran, the author of the Alvis opinion, the court expressly held that the
comparative fault principles adopted in the Alvis decision will be applied in strict product liability
cases, Coney, No. 56306, at 8 (Il1. Sup. Ct. May, 18, 1983), that misuse of the product and
assumption of risk are no longer complete bars to recovery in such cases, id. at 9, and that
comparative fault does not alter the concept of joint and several liability among codefendants,
id. at 13.
In analyzing the propriety of applying comparative principles in the area of strict products
liability, the Coney court quoted Professor Schwartz, see infra note 108, to indicate that juries
have long been comfortable with comparing the defendant's strict liability with the user's con-
tributory negligence. Thus, the court found no support for the "apples and oranges" argument
against the application of comparative fault to products liability cases. See Coney, No. 56306, at 7
(Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983).
Although the court was not asked directly to rule on the issue of the survival of the assump-
tion of risk defense after the adoption of comparative fault, it disposed of the question as
an ancillary aspect of the products liability issue. The court analyzed the history of the assumption
of risk defense in Illinois and stated as follows:
[Tihis court, in Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., adopted misuse and assump-
tion of risk as complete defenses to a strict products liability action. But, at the
same time, it was said there that "[clontributory negligence of the plaintiff is not
a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence." We adhere
to this statement. We believe that a consumer's unobservant, inattentive, ignorant,
or awkward failure to discover or guard against a defect should not be compared
as a damage reducing factor.
Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
In expressly holding that misuse and assumption of risk will no longer be complete bars
to recovery in a strict products liability case, the Coney court stated:
[S]uch misconduct will be compared in the apportionment of damages. Specifical-
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Ancillary questions suggested by Alvis await resolution on a case-by-case
basis.3 Specific questions arising from the Alvis court's adoption of com-
parative negligence include: whether the concepts of joint and several liability
will be changed?;" whether the abolition of contributory negligence will af-
fect Illinois' statutory torts?;5 whether comparative negligence will alter ac-
ly, we hold: Once defendant's liability is established, and where both the defective
product and plaintiff's misconduct contribute to cause the damages, the comparative
fault principle will operate to reduce plaintiff's recovery by that amount which the
trier of fact finds him at fault.
Id. The Coney decision appears to answer several of the most pressing questions left open
by the Alvis decision. For further discussion of the import of the Coney case, see Chi. Daily
L. Bull., May 18, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Duncan, Coney v. JLG Industries, Inc.: A Brief Case Synopsis,
18 ILL. ST. B.A. TORT TRENDs No. 5 (1983). Although the Illinois Supreme Court in Coney
decided that assumption of risk will no longer be a complete bar to recovery in strict products
liability cases, the more extensive analysis provided by this article may prove beneficial in jurisdic-
tions where the question awaits resolution.
2. For over one hundred years prior to Alvis, Illinois followed the doctrine of contributory
negligence. The contributory negligence doctrine was adopted in Aurora Branch R.R. v. Grimes,
13 I11. 585 (1852). Aurora established the rule that the plaintiff must demonstrate his own
lack of negligence in order to recover in a negligence action. The Aurora court stated:
Where a party seeks to recover damages for a loss which has been caused by
negligence or misconduct, he must be able to show that his own negligence or miscon-
duct has not concurred with that of the other party in producing the injury, and
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, to show not only negligence on the part
of the defendant, but also that he exercised proper care and circumspection; or,
in other words, that he was not guilty of negligence.
Id. at 587.
3. Alvis, 85 I11. 2d at 28, 421 N.E.2d at 898.
4. According to the rule of joint and several liability, if the plaintiff has a cause of action
against two or more defendants and each defendant is liable, then the plaintiff is theoretically
permitted to press for full recovery from each defendant separately. See Frank Parmelee Co.
v. Wheelock, 224 III. 194, 200, 79 N.E. 652, 654 (1906). By adopting a comparative negligence
system which attempts to apportion financial responsibility in relation to fault, the potential
for double recovery by plaintiff would no longer exist. A problem arises, however, when an
insolvent codefendant is involved. See N. Appel, The Effect of Comparative Negligence on
Illinois Procedural and Substantive Law Rules Including Joint and Several Liability, Strict Liability
and Assumption of Risk 2-2 to 2-5 (June 11-12, 1981) (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal
Education seminar: Illinois' New "Pure" Comparative Negligence: Law and Practice) [hereinafter
cited as Appel, Effect of Comparative Negligence]; Comparative Negligence, 16 ILL. ST. B.A.
TORT TRENDS No. 4 (D. Mueller ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Negligence].
5. Illinois has three principal statutory provisions for tort actions. First, the Liquor Con-
trol (Dram Shop) Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, §§ 94-195 (1981), provides that "[e]very person
who is injured in person . . . by any intoxicated person, has a right of action . . . against
any person who by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of such person."
Id. § 135. Because the Dram Shop Act is a statutory, and not a common law, negligence action,
the intoxicated person's conduct does not constitute contributory negligence nor preclude the
plaintiff's recovery. See Nelson v. Araiza, 69 Ill. 2d 534, 539, 372 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1977);
Merritt v. Chonowski, 58 I1. App. 3d 192, 194, 373 N.E.2d 1060, 1061 (3d Dist. 1978).
Second, the Structual Work Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1981), provides that
all scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances,
erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State for the
use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any . . . building
• . . or other structure, shall be erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and
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tions based upon intentional torts6 or willful and wanton misconduct?; ' and
finally, because comparative negligence seems to apply only in "cases in-
volving negligence," 8 whether comparative principles will be precluded in
proper manner, and ...placed and operated [so] as to give proper and adequate
protection to the life and limb of any person ...employed ...thereon, or pass-
ing under or by [the above structures] ...
Id. § 60. Any injury to person or property which results from the willful violation of, or
noncompliance with, these safety standards gives rise to a civil right of action. Id. § 69. The
common law defense of contributory negligence does not bar recovery in an action under the
Structural Work Act. See Bryntesen v. Carroll Constr. Co., 27 111. 2d 566, 568, 190 N.E.2d
315, 317 (1963); Gundich v. Emerson-Comstock Co., 21 111. 2d 117, 130, 171 N.E.2d 60, 67
(1960).
Finally, the Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 §§ 1-.2.2 (1981), provides
a cause of action for the personal representatives of any person whose death was caused by
a wrongful or negligent act if the person injured would have been entitled to an action for
damages had death not occurred. Id. §§ 1-2. The contributory negligence of any beneficiary
is not an affirmative defense but, rather, limits the recovery of the contributorily negligent
person. Id. § 2.
Whether the Alvis court's adoption of comparative negligence will alter these statutory torts
remains to be seen. See Guy, There is Nothing to Compare in Comparative Negligence, 70
ILL. B.J. 484, 486 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Guy]; Kionka, Comparative Negligence Comes
to Illinois, 70 ILL. B.J. 16, 20 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Kionka]; see also Chi. Daily L.
Bull., Sept. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (discussing attorney's opinions regarding the effect of Alvis
on Illinois statutory torts); The New Comparative Negligence Law, 26 ILL ST. B.A. TRIAL BRIEFS
3 (special issue May, 1981) (comparative negligence may affect Dram Shop Act, Structural Work
Act, Highways and Bridges Act, and other statutory provisions) [hereinafter cited as The New
Comparative Negligence Law].
6. Intentional torts such as assault and battery, and libel and slander, require a showing
of the wrongdoer's intent or actual malice. Consequently, a defendant may be subject to greater
liability for intentional torts than for negligent conduct. See Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 350, 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1050 (1st Dist. 1980). For a general
discussion of potential changes in tort law after the adoption of comparative negligence, see
Guy, supra note 5, at 486; Kionka, supra note 5, at 20; Appel, Effect of Comparative Negligence,
supra note 4, at 2-10 to 2-11.
7. Traditionally, contributory negligence was not a defense to a claim for injury caused
by willful and wanton misconduct. See Heidenreich v. Bremner, 260 Ill. 439, 452, 103 N.E.
275, 280 (1913). Comparative negligence will not change that rule because the Illinois Supreme
Court has held that willful and wanton misconduct is different from negligence in kind rather
than merely in degree. See O'Brien v. Township High School Dist. 214, 83 Ill. 2d 462, 468-70,
415 N.E.2d 1015, 1018-19 (1980). Thus, the same factual averments may sustain causes of action
based both on negligence and on willful and wanton misconduct. Id. For commentary on the ap-
plicability of comparative fault principles to allegations of willful and wanton misconduct, see
Guy, supra note 5, at 486; Kionka, supra note 5, at 19-20; Appel, Effect of Comparative
Negligence, supra note 4, at 2-10 to 2-11; Comparative Negligence, supra note 4, at 4.
8. Recovery based on strict products liability was adopted in Illinois in Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 622, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). Contributory negligence is not
a bar to recovery in strict liability. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 426-27, 261
N.E.2d 305, 310 (1970); see also infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. It is probable that
comparative principles will be applied to strict liability actions. See Guy, supra note 5, at 485;
Kionka, supra note 5, at 19; Appel, Effect of Comparative Negligence, supra note 4, at 2-6
to 2-8; Comparative Negligence, supra note 4, at 3-4; see also Chi. Daily L. Bull., Sept. 2,
1981, at 1, col. 3 (quoting the dissent in A Ivis which warned against the adverse effects of com-
parative negligence doctrine on strict liability); The New Comparative Negligence Law, supra
note 5 (it is likely that comparative negligence principles will be applied to strict liability claims).
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strict products liability actions? 9
Analysis of these many unresolved issues' ° is beyond the scope of this
article. Consequently, this article will focus on one narrow question left
unresolved by the Alvis decision: whether the affirmative defense of assump-
tion of risk will continue to be an absolute bar to recovery in strict tort
liability actions?" Initial examination of assumption of risk generally,' 2 and
its development in the Illinois courts in particular, 3 reveals that the affir-
mative defense posits a cardinal unfairness to the plaintiff now that the doc-
trine of comparative negligence is recognized in Illinois."'
The California judiciary's treatment of assumption of risk as a form of
plaintiff misconduct, rather than as a complete bar to recovery, indicates
a burgeoning trend by the courts to apply comparative fault principles to
both contributory negligence and assumption of risk doctrines.'" Additionally,
two recent Illinois cases, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package
Machinery Co." and Alvis v. Ribar,"' illustrate judicial awareness of, and
But cf. Note, Pure Comparative Negligence in Illinois, 58 CHI.-]KErr L. REv. 599, 621-28
(1982) (comparative negligence would compromise the policy goals of strict liability which in-
clude the economic motivation of manufacturers to design and market defect-free products)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Pure Comparative Negligence]. See generally Brewster, Comparative
Negligence in Strict Liability Cases, 42 J. AIR L. & COM. 107 (1976) (equating liability with
fault requires the application of comparative negligence in strict liability actions); Robinson,
Square Pegs (Products Liability) in Round Holes (Comparative Negligence), 52 CAL. ST. B.J.
16 (1977) (discussing alternative comparative negligence concepts as applied to product liability
actions in view of Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975)).
9. Alvis, 85 111. 2d at 25, 421 N.E.2d at 896-97.
10. For a survey of these issues and others, as well as speculation regarding their resolu-
tion, see generally Guy, supra note 5 (predicting that the adoption of comparative negligence
in Illinois will eliminate joint liability); Appel, Effect of Comparative Negligence, supra note
4 (discussing whether joint and several liability is consistent with comparative negligence, and
considering post-Alvis effect of insolvency of one or more tortfeasors in action against multiple
tortfeasors); Comparative Negligence, supra note 4 (questioning, inter alia, whether a cause
of action for willful and wanton misconduct remains after Alvis, and whether a verdict amount
and percentage distribution in an action against some parties would control total damages
recoverable in a later action against other parties). For a general discussion of the significance
of Alvis, see also Ashman, Torts-Comparative Negligence, 67 A.B.A. J. 921 (1981) (summary
of Alvis v. Ribar, highlighting the court's rationale that the concept of comparative negligence
produces a more just distribution of loss); Note, Pure Comparative Negligence, supra note
8, at 599 (discussing issues left unresolved by Alvis); Comparative Negligence-Illinois Judiciary
Adopts the "Pure" Form, 25 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 284 (J. Kennelly ed. 1981) (discussing the
adoption of comparative negligence in Illinois).
II. In Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Il1. 2d 418, 430, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970), the
pre-Alvis court held that assumption of risk was a complete bar to recovery in a strict products
liability action. See also infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 32-51 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
16. 70 111. 2d 1, 12, 374 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1978). For an analysis of Skinner, see infra
notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
17. 85 111. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981). For an analysis of Alvis and the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk, see infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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sympathy for, the injustice created by a complete bar to recovery. Thus,
there is both direct and indirect support for the conclusion that assumption
of risk should no longer bar recovery in an Illinois strict tort liability action. 8
THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK DEFENSE IN STRICT TORT LIABILITY ACTIONS
Any analysis of the assumption of risk doctrine must begin with the
prestigious Restatement (Second) of Torts's definition of the defense in strict
liability actions:' 9
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence
of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases
• . . applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when
such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other
hand, the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Sec-
tion as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers
the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred
from recovery. 20
Consequently, a plaintiff who merely inadvertently overlooked a product
defect can still recover damages caused by the defect. A plaintiff will be
18. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
19. A detailed history of the assumption of risk doctrine in the context of a strict tort
liability action, and particularly its metamorphosis in the Restatement of Torts, is beyond the
purview of this article. For such an historical perspective, see Twerski, Old Wine in a New
Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Area, 60 IOWA L. REV.
1, 4-10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask]. See also Note, Assumption
of Risk and Strict Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REV. 872, 873-75 (1982) (although plain-
tiff's recovery was barred under the traditional concept of assumption of risk, recent decisions
have limited the circumstances in which the plaintiff's assumption of risk completely bars recovery
in strict liability actions) [hereinafter cited as Note, Assumption of Risk].
20. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) (emphasis added). The
Reporter's use of the term "contributory negligence," of the type which consists in "voluntari-
ly and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger," is more commonly referred
to as "assumption of risk." Section 402A delineates the elements of a strict liability action
as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. § 402A. Furthermore, the Restatement evaluates assumption of risk arising from negligent
or reckless conduct. Id. §§ 496A-496G. It also discusses a plaintiff's consent to accept the
harm arising from the defendant's intentional conduct. Id. § 892.
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precluded from recovery, however, if he assumed the risk of injury by
discovering that the product was defective and unreasonably exposed himself
to the known hazard. The Restatement's characterization of assumption of
risk in strict liability actions as a "form" of contributory negligence 2' has
been criticized as blurring the distinction between contributory negligence
and assumption of risk.2" It would seem more appropriate to state that con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk simply are different degrees of
plaintiff misconduct to be considered when determining liability.
Under the Restatement definition, whether the plaintiff's conduct will be
classified as assumption of risk by the fact finder depends upon the resolu-
tion of one question: How voluntary and reasonable were the plaintiff's
actions in light of his knowledge of the product? According to the Restate-
ment, if the plaintiff's conduct meets a threshold level of voluntary and
unreasonable action, he will have assumed the risk of his injury. It is often
difficult, however, to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the plaintiff
made a conscious choice to perform some act relative to the defective pro-
duct. For example, in an effort to prevent a machine from jamming, an
experienced factory worker may make a split-second decision to place his
hand into the machine subsequent to the moment of known danger during
operation. 3 Should such a split-second "decision" be considered voluntary
and unreasonable if the operator believed the expensive machinery would
be damaged if he allowed the jamming to occur? Under the Restatement's
definition of assumption of risk, the fact finder must delve into the plain-
tiff's subjective state of mind to determine whether he assumed the risk of
injury."4 Conversely, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is determined by
reference to an objective standard-that of the "reasonable man." Because
the facts are often insufficient to indicate the plaintiff's actual "knowledge,
understanding and appreciation of the danger," 25 it is virtually impossible
to make this determination in a fair and accurate manner.
21. Id. § 402A comment n.
22. See, e.g., Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV.
171, 176 (1974) ("The Restatement [Second's] position ...has been a rule in search of a
rationale"); Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask, supra note 19, at 3 ("The second Restate-
ment['s ... language is vague, inexact and somewhat delphic."); Note, Assumption of Risk,
supra note 19, at 874 ("The Restatement . . .is too ambiguous to provide guidance in the
proper use of the assumption of risk defense"); Note, Assumption of the Risk as the Only
Affirmative Defense Available in Strict Products Liability Actions in Oregon: Baccelleri v. Hyster
Co., 17 WILLAMErrE L.J. 495, 500 (1981) (because contributory negligence and assumption
of risk are frequently difficult to distinguish, behavior may often be characterized by either
designation).
23. See Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 355, 247 A.2d 603, 605 (1968) (recovery bar-
red because plaintiff "did exactly what obviously was dangerous-reached into an operating
• . .machine"); see also Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask, supra note 19, at 32-34 (author
disagrees with Bartkewich on grounds that the plaintiff's action was not voluntary and
unreasonable).
24. See supra text accompanying note 20.
25. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11. 2d 418, 430, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970).
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A recent unreported case in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois,
Schwass v. Uniloy Division-Hoover Ball & Bearing Co., 26 illustrates the un-
necessary difficulties which the finder of fact must confront when evaluating
the plaintiff's decision-making process. The plaintiff in Schwass reached in-
to a machine to remove a lodged glass bottle while the machine was running."
He apparently had been instructed as to the machine's operation and warned
not to place his hands into the dangerous area of the machine. 8 The plain-
tiff knew he had a maximum of three seconds to reach his hand in and
out of the machine without being injured." The question arose whether this
plaintiff's instantaneous action, based upon his subjective decision-making
judgment, could be characterized as voluntary or unreasonable under the
Restatement. Alternatively, could this action be viewed objectively, as a matter
of law, as a reflex action by a Chaplinesque factory worker who, as in
Modern Times, attended a machine that was engaged in a seemingly un-
ending mechanical process, the continuum of which was broken only momen-
tarily by a stuck glass bottle? This case exemplifies the basic unfairness to
the plaintiff in requiring the fact finder to determine his subjective state
of mind by applying vague standards of voluntariness and reasonableness.3 0
The logical question to be asked is whether the ends of justice are served
by barring a plaintiff's recovery based on the dubious requirements of the
Restatement.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN STRICT TORT LIABILITY ACTIONS IN ILLINOIS
Despite its imprecision, the Restatement's definition of assumption of risk
has been instrumental in forming the contours of the doctrine in strict tort
liability cases." For example, the Restatement inspired the leading Illinois
case on assumption of risk, Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. 2 The
plaintiff in Williams was operating a trenching machine while standing be-
tween the handlebars at the back of the machine. A portion of the trencher
26. No. 79-L-27454 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, II1., June 28, 1982) (order denying motion
for summary judgment).
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id.
29. Id. The defendant in Schwass moved for summary judgment, contending that the plain-
tiff had assumed the risk of injury. Summary judgment was denied and the circuit court ruled
that the assumption of risk was not a bar to recovery in a strict products liability action because
of the adoption of comparative negligence. Id. at 1.
30. The subjective-objective dichotomy is discussed in Comment, The Knowledge Element
of Assumption of Risk as a Defense to Strict Products Liability, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
243 (1977).
31. See, e.g., Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972) (New Mexico Supreme
Court adopted the Restatement view of strict liability and applied it to retailers, manufacturers,
and suppliers); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (Oklahoma
Supreme Court adopted the Restatement definition of "unreasonably dangerous" in the con-
text of strict product. liability); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975) (Vermont
Supreme Court adopted the Restatement view of strict product liability).
32. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
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became caught on an underground pipe. After slipping off the pipe, the
machine lurched backward and severely injured the plaintiff.3 The plaintiff
contended that the machine was defective because it lacked a safety device
to prevent such an accident. The plaintiff further alleged that the drive-belt
mechanism was not constructed properly and that the machine lacked a
warning label regarding the danger of operating the machine from behind
and between the handlebars.3 4 The plaintiff claimed that the instruction
manual accompanying the trencher did not refer to the proper position for
the operator; rather, the manual dealt only with the functioning of the
machine's drive-belts. Because the plaintiff acknowledged that he had read
the manual, at least in part, prior to his injury,3" the defendant contended
that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of his injury.36
The Illinois Supreme Court quoted the Restatement's definition of assump-
tion of risk in strict liability actions. 7 Apparently in an effort to define
the plaintiff's conduct within that framework, the court noted that a "greater
degree of culpability" is required to bar a plaintiff's recovery in a tort action
that is not based upon negligence than in one that is based on negligence.3" The
court held that contributory negligence would not bar recovery in a strict
product liability action in Illinois,39 but indicated that the assumption of
risk defense would continue to preclude recovery.'" The court clearly adopted
the Restatement's subjective standards and stated that it is within the jury's
province to apply these standards to determine the plaintiff's "knowledge,
understanding and appreciation of the danger" of the product. 4' Thus, after
Williams, contributory negligence was a complete bar to the plaintiff's
33. Id. at 421-22, 261 N.E.2d at 307.
34. Id. at 422, 261 N.E.2d at 307.
35. Id. at 423, 261 N.E.2d at 307-08.
36. Id. at 421, 261 N.E.2d at 307. The defendant also contended that the action was barred
by the statute of limitations. Id. at 431, 261 N.E.2d at 312. The court rejected this claim,
holding that the plaintiff's burden of proof provided adequate safeguards against injustice.
Id. at 432, 261 N.E.2d at 313.
37. Id. at 423, 261 N.E.2d at 308 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A com-
ment n (1965)). For the Restatement's definition, see supra text accompanying note 20.
38. The court stated:
[A] greater degree of culpability on the part of a plaintiff will be required in order
to bar recovery in some types of action [sic] than in others. Thus, his simple con-
tributory negligence (i.e., lack of due care for one's own safety as measured by
the objective reasonable-man standard) will bar recovery by a plaintiff in a tort
action for negligence ... but as to other types of actions a greater degree of culp-
ability on plaintiff's part may be necessary in order to preclude recovery and sim-
ple contributory negligence will not suffice.
Williams, 45 111. 2d at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309 (emphasis added). The court then
shifted to a qualitative analysis and examined whether "recovery will be barred
only when'the nature of plaintiff's misconduct has reached the point at which he
has misused the product or has assumed the risk of its use."
Id. at 426, 261 N.E.2d at 310 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 427, 261 N.E.2d at 310.
40. Id. at 430, 261 N.E.2d at 312:
41. Id.
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recovery in a negligence action, but did not bar recovery in a strict product
liability case. In both types of action, assumption of risk continued to bar
plaintiff's recovery.
For over a decade, the Williams decision has been the cornerstone of the
Illinois courts' position on the assumption of risk defense.' 2 Some cases subse-
quent to Williams have emphasized the requirement that the plaintiff's sub-
jective knowledge of the product's dangerous propensities be ascertained.' 3
Others have focused on the requirement that the plaintiff's conduct be
voluntary." For example, in Collins v. Musgrave,'5 the defendant Musgrave,
the proprietor of a small service station, sold the plaintiff a defective axle
assembly unit which had been manufactured by the Ford Motor Company."6
The unit was installed in the plaintiff's Ford truck. Later, when the plain-
tiff was driving on the highway near Musgrave's service station, the brakes
in the newly installed unit failed. Instead of stopping on the shoulder of
the roadway, the plaintiff coasted into Musgrave's station and struck a brick
wall.' 7 There was no evidence that the plaintiff could have discovered the
defect before the accident occurred. Even if there was such evidence, failure
to discover a product defect only constitutes contributory negligence and does
not bar recovery in a strict products liability action." Consequently, neither
Ford nor Musgrave raised this issue. Instead, the defendants relied on the
assumption of risk defense and alleged that the plaintiff had "unreasonably
proceed[ed] to encounter a known danger' ' 9 by continuing into the service
station rather than immediately stopping at the roadside."0 Due to the insuf-
ficiency of evidence regarding the plaintiff's knowledge of the assembly defect,
the Collins court held that his split-second decision to turn into Musgrave's
42. As one commentator has stated, "[tihe classical form of assumption of risk relieves
a defendant of liability for accident losses when the plaintiff knew and appreciated the risk
of injury posed by the defendant, but nevertheless voluntarily proceeded to encounter the risk
of harm." Note, Assumption of Risk, supra note 19, at 873-74.
43. See, e.g., Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 981, 991, 360
N.E.2d 440, 447-48 (1st Dist. 1977) (summary judgment for defendant reversed because ques-
tion of fact existed regarding whether plaintiff actually knew, understood, and appreciated the
danger of a possible movement of the railroad car under which he was working); see also
Campbell v. Nordo Prods., 629 F.2d 1258, 1262 (7th Cir. 1980) (assumption of risk is measured
by subjective standard of whether "plaintiff's decedent knowingly, voluntarily, and deliberate-
ly encountered" the risk) (emphasis in original).
44. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural Chems., 81 Il1. 2d 206, 214, 407 N.E.2d 32,
35-36 (1980) (plaintiff who was injured while attempting to fill a fertilizer machine with liquid
nitrogen did not voluntarily face a known danger, even though he had read instruction decal
on machine regarding its use and failed to check air pressure gauge as instructed).
45. 28 Il1. App. 3d 307, 328 N.E.2d 649 (5th Dist. 1975).
46. Id. at 310, 328 N.E.2d at 650-51.
47. Id.
48. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Il. 2d 418, 427, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970). For
a discussion of Williams, see supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
49. Collins, 28 11. App. 3d at 311-14, 328 N.E.2d at 652-54 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965)).
50. Id.
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lot under emergency conditions was neither voluntary nor unreasonable.
Therefore, recovery was not barred by the assumption of risk defense."
The Collins court addressed a factual situation that did not support a fin-
ding of assumption of risk. Additional facts may have produced the same
result. For example, it might never have occurred to the plaintiff to inspect
the newly installed assembly for defects before driving the truck. Alternatively,
the plaintiff deliberately might have chosen not to inspect the brakes. Final-
ly, the plaintiff may have inspected the assembly, but failed to discover the
defect in the brakes. None of these possibilities should bar plaintiff's recovery
because the failure to discover the defect in the product, or "to guard against
the possibility of . . . [the] existence" of such a defect does not amount
to assumption of risk under the Restatement.2
Alternatively, if the plaintiff inspected the assembly and discovered the
defect in the brakes, yet proceeded to drive his truck back to the seller's
station for further repair, it is probable that a jury would conclude that
the plaintiff's subjective "knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the
danger"" rendered his actions unreasonable and voluntary. Pursuant to both
the Restatement test and the Williams decision, the plaintiff in this situation
would have assumed the risk of injury, thereby barring recovery. These
examples further illustrate the inherent unfairness in the subjective standards
of the assumption of risk doctrine. The fine distinctions made by the fact
finder in a post-Williams strict products liability case regarding the plain-
tiff's conduct can form the difference between a recovery, based upon con-
tributory negligence, and no recovery, based upon a finding of assumption
of risk."' To exacerbate the injustice, The Restatement standard appears to
place an unarticulated obligation on the plaintiff to inspect for product defects
in order to "guard against the possibility of . . . [their] existence."" Fur-
thermore, if the plaintiff does inspect for defects, it is to his advantage not
to discover them. When the plaintiff merely fails to recognize a defect upon
inspection, he is guilty, at most, of "contributory negligence" and his ac-
tion should not be barred. In contrast, when the plaintiff inspects and finds
the defect, his action could be barred by assumption of risk if the finder
of fact determines that he had the requisite knowledge of the defect and,
nonetheless, unreasonably proceeded to encounter the danger. Ironically, the
Restatement seems to reward plaintiffs who do not inspect the products they
use.
These fine distinctions," promulgated by the concept of assumption of
51. Id, at 313, 328 N.E.2d at 653.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment n (1965).
53. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d at 430, 261 N.E.2d at 312.
54. See Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask, supra note 19, at 22-24. "[Tihe maneuvering
room for assumption of risk . . . [is] very narrow, [and] one must ask if it is worthwhile
to permit the existence of [this] independent defense." Id. at 24-25.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
56. Such distinctions may properly be labeled hair splitting because assumption of risk and
contributory negligence are so difficult to distinguish. See Provence v. Doolin, 91 Ill. App.
3d 271, 280-81, 414 N.E.2d 786, 793-94 (5th Dist. 1980) ("In such cases it is clear that the
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risk as characterized in the Restatement and Williams, are fundamentally
unfair to the plaintiff. Recently, however, enlightened courts have begun
to reject these distinctions. California has led this movement," and Illinois
does not appear to be far behind."
ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN STRICT TORT LIABILITY ACTIONS IN CALIFORNIA
FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
California has long been a forerunner in products liability law.5 9 Hence,
the Illinois courts occasionally have looked to California law for guidance
in products liability actions. 6° In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.," California adopted
comparative negligence. In Daly v. General Motors Corp., 2 the California
judiciary abolished assumption of risk as an affirmative defense in strict
liability cases. A review of these cases illustrates how the defense of assump-
tion of risk progressed in strict tort liability actions brought in Illinois courts.
In Li, the plaintiff driver was making a left turn when he was struck by
a taxicab approaching from the opposite direction.63 The lower court found
that the cab driver's actions were unsafe because he had been proceeding
at a speed of thirty miles per hour through the intersection on a yellow
light."' The court also found that the plaintiff's left turn "was made at a
time when a vehicle was approaching in the opposite direction so close as
to constitute an immediate hazard." ' 65 The lower court ruled that the plain-
defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence overlap, and are as intersecting
circles, with a considerable area in common, where neither excludes the possibility of the other.")
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 441 (4th ed. 1971)). In Russo
v. The Range, Inc., 76 IIl. App. 3d 236, 238, 395 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1st Dist. 1979), the court stated:
[The theory of assumption of risk] . . . borders and at times intersects with the
theory of contributory negligence. It occurs when . . . the plaintiff, aware of a
danger created by the defendant's negligence, proceeds voluntarily to encounter it.
Illinois recognizes this type of assumption of risk as an affirmative defense in pro-
ducts liability cases.
(citing Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970)). The Russo court's
citation to Williams, a strict liability case, to define assumption of risk in a negligence context,
exemplifies the general confusion experienced by the courts in distinguishing contributory
negligence and assumption of risk in negligence and strict liability actions.
57. See infra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
59. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962) (predecessor of Restatement § 402A elements of strict liability).
60. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 621, 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1965) (citing
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897., 901, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 701 (1962)); see also Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 425-26, 261 N.E.2d
305, 309 (1970) (court acknowledged that in nonnegligence actions, simple contributory negligence
is insufficient to preclude recovery) (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962)).
61. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
62. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 735 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
63. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 809, 532 P.2d 1226, 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 861 (1975).
64. Id. at 809, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
65. Id. at 809, 532 P.2d at 1229-30, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861-63.
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tiff's negligence had contributed to the collision and that recovery was barred
"by reason of such contributory negligence." 66
The California Supreme Court reversed this ruling, replacing the "all or
nothing" rule of contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative
negligence. 7 The purpose of the comparative system was to assign respon-
sibility for damages in proportion to each party's negligence. 68 Consequent-
ly, the plaintiff's contributory negligence did not bar recovery, but rather,
diminished his damages in proportion to his negligence. 9 The Li court reached
its conclusion by relying on "logic, practical experience, and fundamental
justice.""
The Li court evaluated the traditional assumption of risk defense within
the new comparative negligence structure and stated:
As for assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state that this defense
overlaps that of contributory negligence to some extent. . . . [A] system
of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of
assumption of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in
proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assump-
tion of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence.
... [Assumption of risk is] to be subsumed under the general process of
assessing liability in proportion to fault .... 11
Going one step further, in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,' the California
Supreme Court defined the role of assumption of risk in the strict liability
context. The plaintiffs' decedent in Daly was driving his automobile on a
freeway at fifty to seventy miles per hour when the car struck a metal divider
fence. The driver's door was thrown open upon impact, and, as the
automobile spun around, the driver was forcibly ejected and killed.73 The
plaintiffs brought a strict liability action, contending that a defectively de-
signed car latch was the proximate cause of the death.7 ' The defendant,
General Motors, the manufacturer of the decedent's car, claimed that the
decedent's alleged intoxication, and his failure to use the seatbelt-shoulder
harness system and the door lock, contributed to his death.
The Supreme Court of California did not discuss whether the decedent
had read the automobile manual, which encouraged use of the safety equip-
ment; whether the decedent knew, or should have known, that his failure
66. Id. at 809, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
67. Id. at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243-44, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
68. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864. The Alvis court based its adoption
of comparative negligence on the same policy considerations as did the Li court. See Alvis
v. Ribar, 85 I11. 2d 1, 16-18, 25-27, 421 N.E.2d 886, 892-93, 897-98 (1981).
71. 13 Cal. 3d at 824-26, 532 P.2d at 1240-42, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-74.
72. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
73. Id. at 730, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 731, 575 P.2d at 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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to use the safety equipment could contribute to serious injury; or whether
his intoxication was evidence that he "voluntarily and unreasonably pro-
ceed[ed] to encounter a known danger."" In short, the court did not evaluate
the decedent's conduct in the context of the Restatement's definition of con-
tributory negligence (failure to discover the product defect), or the Restate-
ment's classic definition of assumption of risk (voluntary and unreasonable
decision to risk a known hazard) in strict liability." Rather, the Supreme
Court of California characterized the decedent's conduct as no more than
a "variant of contributory negligence which was merged into the assessment
of liability in proportion to fault."7 " The court proclaimed that the "defense
of 'assumption of risk,' to the extent that it is a form of contributory
negligence, is abolished" in strict liability actions."
The Daly court also noted that precise distinctions between the terms com-
parative negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk were
"less important than the attainment of a just and equitable result."8 To
the court, the absence of such distinctions in the area of strict liability sug-
gested that a "judicial posture that is flexible rather than doctrinaire" should
be adopted.8 The Daly court's conciliation of these concepts82 evidences the
court's focus on ensuring substantial justice for the parties. Because the pro-
motion of substantial justice is also of paramount importance to the Illinois
Supreme Court,83 it is likely that Illinois will follow Li and Daly.
CURRENT CASE LAW IN ILLINOIS
The Illinois Supreme Court moved to a system of comparative apportion-
ment of damages in two recent cases, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division
Packaging Machinery Co.8" and Alvis v. Ribar."1 These decisions, one in-
volving a strict products liability claim, and the other a negligence action,
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
77. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 736-38, 575 P.2d at 1167-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87 (citing Li
v. Yellow Cab, 13 Cal. 3d at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73).
78. Id. at 735, 575 P.2d at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (citing Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824, 532
P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872).
79. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
80. Id. at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (emphasis added).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. In Daly, the California court broadly combined comparative negligence and strict pro-
ducts liability concepts. The court refused "to resolve the important issue before [it] by the
simple expedient of matching linguistic labels which have evolved either for convenience or
by custom." Id. The court stated that "the theoretical and semantic distinctions between the
twin principles of strict products liability and traditional negligence.., can be blended or accom-
modated," particularly where the development of these principles has involved "much concep-
tual overlapping and interweaving in order to attain substantial justice." Id. at 734-35, 575 P.2d
at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
83. See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 I11. 2d 1, 16-18, 25-27, 421 N.E.2d 886, 892-93, 898 (1981);
see also Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 I11. 2d 1, 11-13, 374 N.E.2d
437, 441-43 (1978) (no-contribution rule abandoned because of its unjust results).
84. 70 I11. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1978).
85. 85 I11. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
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provide the groundwork for modifying the assumption of risk affirmative
defense in strict tort liability cases.
In Skinner, the plaintiff brought a strict products liability action against
the manufacturer of an injection molding machine that malfunctioned and
caused her injuries." The manufacturer, in turn, filed a third-party com-
plaint against the plaintiff's employer,87 alleging that the employer had mis-
used the product and assumed the risk of injury. The court held that the
third-party complaint "state[d] a cause of action for contribution based on
the relative degree to which the defective product and the employer's misuse
of the product or its assumption of the risk contributed to cause plaintiff's
injuries.""8 Accordingly, the court examined the equities of the case and
apportioned the plaintiff's damages between the manufacturer and the
employer based upon the extent to which the condition of the product and
the employer's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.9
The Skinner court stated in dicta that the plaintiff's misuse of the pro-
duct or her assumption of the risk would bar her recovery.9" While this in-
dicates the court's previous intent to retain the assumption of risk defense
as a bar in strict liability actions, the Skinner court's application of assump-
tion of risk against a third-party defendant represented a significant depar-
ture from the traditional role portrayed by the affirmative defense in a strict
products liability action. This novel usage of the doctrine may indicate that
the Illinois Supreme Court, pursuant to equitable principles, will apply
assumption of risk in other nontraditional ways in the future.9"
While the Skinner decision may be construed as the first indication that
the doctrine is changing in Illinois, Alvis v. Ribar92 may be the second
manifestation of this transformation. Although Alvis was a negligence action,
the rationale applied by the Alvis court is equally applicable to the assump-
tion of risk doctrine in strict products liability cases. In Alvis, the plaintiff
was injured while riding as a passenger in the defendant's car, which skidd-
86. 70 II1. 2d at 4-5, 374 N.E.2d at 438.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443; see also Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 Ill.
2d 47, 49-50, 374 N.E.2d 458, 459 (1978) (manufacturer may bring cause of action for contribu-
tion against employer where pleadings alleged product misuse and/or assumption of risk); Stevens
v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 II1. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1978) (manufacturer may sue for partial
indemnity against employer where pleadings alleged product misuse or assumption of risk).
89. 70 111. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
90. Id. at 15, 374 N.E.2d at 443 (citing Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261
N.E.2d 305 (1970)).
91. As one commentator recognized, "since the court must be using the terms in an in-
novative sense, it can be speculated that the court is suggesting a doctrine of assumption of
part of the risk or implying that assumption of risk and misuse are partial defenses which
reduce rather than bar liability." Note, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice: The Application of Con-
tribution to Strict Product Liability, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 165, 180 (1978) (emphasis
in original). For arguments that the holding in Skinner was a maverick use of assumption
of risk, see Justice Underwood's and Justice Dooley's separate dissenting opinions in Skinner,
70 111. 2d at 20-22, 374 N.E.2d at 445-46 (Underwood, J., dissenting), and id. at 22-41, 374
N.E.2d at 446-55 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
92. 85 111. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
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ed out of control and struck a stop sign.93 The Illinois Supreme Court ex-
tended its earlier decision in Williams, which had established that contributory
negligence would not bar recovery in a strict products liability action, 94 by
abolishing the long-standing rule that contributory negligence bars recovery
in a negligence action. The Alvis court adopted the doctrine! of comparative
negligence, whereby the plaintiff's negligence merely reduces her damages
in proportion to her responsibility for the injury.95 The Alvis court's ra-
tionale for adopting comparative negligence was to correct the fundamental
injustice perpetuated by contributory negligence. 96 The court reasoned that
it was unfair to require a slightly negligent plaintiff to bear the entire cost
of her injury. Therefore, the court opined that attributing financial respon-
sibility in accordance with each party's respective negligence would promote
fairness and justice for both the plaintiff and the defendant.." Having cited
the California Li case in support of this judicial emphasis on substantial
justice,9" the Alvis court also noted that the Skinner decision resolved "[tihe
collateral issue of contribution among joint tort-feasors" by applying com-
parative negligence principles.99
By allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors, the Illinois court in Skin-
ner initiated a movement toward equitable apportionment of damages. The
Alvis decision constituted the next logical step by permitting a comparison
of the plaintiff's and the defendant's fault in negligence actions in the in-
terests of justice. This concern for fairness may foster modifications of the
assumption of risk defense in Illinois.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK SHOULD No LONGER BAR RECOVERY IN STRICT
LIABILITY ACTIONS IN ILLINOIS
Several ideas support the conclusion that the Illinois courts soon will con-
sider assumption of risk a diminishing factor in recovery, rather than a com-
93. Id. at 4, 421 N.E.2d at 887. Neither the Illinois Supreme Court nor the appellate court
specified the factual basis for a finding of contributory negligence. See 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d
886 (1981); 78 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 398 N.E.2d 124 (1979).
94. See supra text accompanying note 39.
95. 85 Ill. 2d at 25-28, 421 N.E.2d at 896-98. The Alvis court adopted comparative negligence
in its pure form. Id. at 27-28, 421 N.E.2d at 898. This means that a plaintiff's action is not
barred regardless of how great his negligence may be. The modified form of comparative
negligence bars a plaintiff's recovery when the negligence attributable to him reaches a certain
percentage of the total amount of injury producing negligence. The minimum percentage is
50% in some states, 51% in others. Id.
96. Id. at 15-21, 421 N.E.2d at 892-95.
97. Id. at 16-17, 421 N.E.2d at 893.
98. Id. at 17-18, 21, 27, 421 N.E.2d at 893, 895, 898.
99. The Alvis court stated: "[In Skinner] this court found that 'governing equitable prin-
ciples require that ultimate liability for plaintiff's injuries be apportioned on the basis of the
relative degree to which [each defendant's] conduct proximately caused them.'" Id. at 28, 421
N.E.2d at 898 (quoting Skinner, 70 111. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 442). Interestingly, the Alvis
court's quotation of this Skinner excerpt is inaccurate. Rather than compare each defendant's
responsibility, the Skinner court compared the defective product with the employer's negligence.
This anomaly does not, however, detract from Alvis's necessary reference to Skinner.
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plete bar to recovery in strict tort liability actions. This transformation appears
likely because the Illinois judiciary has demonstrated its concern for fun-
damental fairness and equitable allocation of liability in both strict pro-
ducts liability (Skinner) and negligence (Alvis) actions. The Skinner court's
rationale for abolishing the no-contribution rule was based upon the un-
fairness of the indemnity doctrine.' 0 The Alvis court's abolition of the con-
tributory negligence bar to recovery in negligence cases constituted an
equitable correction of the defense's "all or nothing" rule.' With this cur-
rent judicial sentiment, it is probable that, when presented with the proper
case, the Illinois courts will recast the assumption of risk defense in strict
products liability actions based upon principles of justice.
The first argument which supports modification of the assumption of risk
defense is that the defense is unfair to the plaintiff because the fact finder's
subjective inquiry into whether the plaintiff's choice was knowing, volun-
tary, and unreasonable is an imprecise venture. I2 The Alvis court abolished
contributory negligence as an affirmative defense in negligence cases because
it was sufficiently disturbed by the objective "reasonable man" test of con-
tributory negligence."0 3 After Alvis, the question arises whether a plaintiff
still should be completely denied recovery in a strict liability action when
the jury is instructed to use the incognizable subjective standards of the
assumption of risk defense. The logical solution to this problem is to allow
the plaintiff partial recovery on his cause of action, even if his conduct was
unreasonable, and then simply to evaluate that conduct in relation to the defen-
dant's responsibility for the defective product.
Altering the assumption of risk defense in Illinois would not be un-
precedented because California has already forged a path in the Li and Daly
100. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Packaging Mach. Co., 70 I1l. 2d 1, 10-13, 374 N.E.2d
437, 442 (1978); see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
101. Alvis, 85 111. 2d at 16-18, 25-27, 421 N.E.2d at 892-93, 897-98; see also Li, 13 Cal.
3d at 810 n.3, 532 P.2d at 1230 n.3, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862 n.3 ("[Contributory negligence]
places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are ... responsible.") (quoting
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971)).
102. The argument that assumption of risk should be modified because it is unfair to the
plaintiff may be summarized as follows:
The values of individual responsibility and voluntary choice, however, provide weak
support for the classical defense of assumption of risk in the modern context of
strict products liability. First, the voluntary-choice justification does not distinguish
the plaintiff's conduct from that of the defendant, since the manufacturer too has
made a conscious choice to sell products with certain calculable risks and inevitable
accident costs. If both the plaintiff's and the defendant's conscious choices are respon-
sible for the resulting injury and if the relative quality of the knowledge that each
possesses to inform his choice is not relevant to the application of the assumption
of risk defense, it is hard to see why the plaintiff's choice to assume the risk is
weightier in fairness terms than the defendant's choice to impose it.
Note, Assumption of Risk, supra note 19, at 888-89 (1982); see also Twerski, From Defect
to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L.
REV. 297, 347-48 (1977) (where a plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known
risk, recovery should be reduced); supra note 22; supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
103. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 16-21, 421 N.E.2d 886, 892-95 (1981).
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cases."0 ' In Alvis, the Illinois court relied on the California court's reason-
ing when it adopted comparative negligence.0 5 Based upon the Illinois
Supreme Court's recognition of the California experience in the develop-
ment of products liability law, it is likely that the court again will refer
to the reasoning of that jurisdiction to support a change in the assumption
of risk defense.
As some commentators have noted, 06 adopting a modified version of the
assumption of risk defense would not equate that defense with contributory
negligence. A crucial distinction between the two concepts is that assump-
tion of risk involves a tacit agreement by the plaintiff to accept the risk
of harm through his conduct."' In contrast, this tacit agreement to accept
the risk of harm is lacking in contributory negligence. Otherwise, the con-
ceptual differences between the two are irrelevant. Assumption of risk and
contributory negligence are simply two gradations of plaintiff conduct that
are different in degree, but not in kind. In a comparative causation system,
the plaintiff's misconduct should be viewed on a continuum between slight
negligence and overt consent to injury and should be evaluated in relation
to the defendant's responsibility. If a plaintiff's mere negligence, which is
perhaps a mild state of plaintiff misconduct, only limits recovery, then con-
sistency demands that a plaintiff's assumption of risk, while admittedly a
more serious degree of plaintiff misconduct, should be a diminishing factor
in recovery, rather than a total bar. Illinois seems to be moving toward a
system of comparative causation, as evidenced by Skinner and Alvis. Con-
sequently, the next step in a logical progression is to treat assumption of
risk in the same manner that contributory negligence has already been treated:
neither should bar a cause of action in strict products liability.0 8
104. See supra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 98.
106. For an illuminating discussion on the illusory concept of conscious decision making
that lies at the heart of the voluntariness requirement of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
see V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ]. Schwartz
observes that
[p]robably the strongest argument for retention of assumption of risk as a com-
plete defense is based on the generic difference between assumption of the risk
and contributory negligence. In theory, it is based not so much on plaintiff's fault
as on his agreement by his conduct to take the risk of the very consequences that
befell him. Viewed from that perspective, it is a close cousin of the Consent defense
in intentional torts. Since consent would remain an absolute defense to intentional
torts under a comparative negligence system, a fortiori, assumption of risk should
keep its place as a bar to negligence.
The best answer to this contention is that assumption of the risk differs from
consent in one important respect. By consent to an intentional tort, plaintiff manifests
his agreement to the actual invasion of his interest in person or property. On the
other hand, when plaintiff assumes a risk, he volunteers to be subject to a possible
injury. This is a giant step away from consent when viewed from the perspective
of whether plaintiff has actually agreed to hold defendant harmless for the risk.
Id. § 9.5, at 173-74 (emphasis in original).
107. Id.
108. It also should be noted that apportioning damages based on the respective responsi-
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CONCLUSION
The defense of assumption of risk in strict tort liability actions, as created
by the Restatement and adopted by Illinois in the Williams decision, espouses
a vague and subjective inquiry into whether the plaintiff's decision to use
a product was voluntary and reasonable. This dubious test often results in
the denial of a plaintiff's recovery. Illinois courts should eliminate the un-
fairness of the assumption of risk defense in strict tort liability actions based
upon the same rationales employed by the Skinner and Alvis decisions, which
rejected the injustice of the no-contribution and contributory negligence rules.
The Illinois judiciary's concern with fairness, guided in part by California's
development of the assumption of risk defense, dictates that comparative
fault principles should apply to all plaintiff conduct, regardless of grada-
tion. Therefore, the Illinois defense of assumption of risk in strict tort liability
actions should no longer completely bar recovery, but rather, should diminish
that recovery in proportion to the plaintiff's responsibility for causing the
injury. Fairness demands nothing less.
bility of the parties presents no greater difficulty to a jury than it already may have in deter-
mining the plaintiff's subjective state of mind, as required by the assumption of risk defense.
See Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d at 20, 421 N.E.2d at 893. The experienced trial attorney and judge should
recognize that juries, in the sanctuary of the locked deliberation room, often decide questions
of liability and damages based on their own notions of fairness. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106,
at 208-09.
[Vol. 32:299
